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Abstract 
With other factors controlled, negative words elicit slower lexical decisions and naming than 
positive words (Estes & Adelman, this issue). Moreover, this marked difference in responding 
to negative words and to positive words (i.e., between-category discontinuity) was 
accompanied by relatively uniform responding among negative words (i.e., within-category 
equivalence), thus suggesting a categorical model of automatic vigilance. Larsen, Mercer, 
Balota, and Strube (this issue) corroborated our observation that valence predicts lexical 
decision and word naming latencies. However, on the basis of an interaction between linear 
arousal and linear valence, they claim that automatic vigilance does not occur among arousing 
stimuli and they purport to reject the categorical model. Here we show that (1) this interaction 
is logically irrelevant to whether automatic vigilance is categorical, (2) the linear interaction is 
statistically consistent with the categorical model, (3) the interaction is not observed within 
the categorical model, and (4) despite having five fewer parameters, the categorical model 
predicts word recognition times as well as the interaction model. Thus, automatic vigilance is 
categorical and generalizes across levels of arousal. 
 




Previously, we demonstrated that the affective factors of arousal and valence predict 
lexical decision and word naming times (Estes & Adelman, this issue). Responses were faster 
for highly arousing words than for less arousing words, and for positive words than for 
negative words. The effect of valence on word recognition was of particular importance, as it 
provided strong evidence of automatic vigilance (described below). Indeed, by controlling 
lexical factors such as length and frequency (see Larsen, Mercer, & Balota, 2006) among 
more than a thousand words, our analysis provided the most powerful demonstration yet of 
automatic vigilance. Larsen, Mercer, Balota, and Strube (this issue) report an alternative 
analysis of the same dataset, and their results corroborated our observation that valence 
predicts lexical decision and word naming latencies. Both analyses therefore indicated that 
affective factors influence lexical processing, and both analyses supported the validity of 
automatic vigilance. However, the two analyses diverge critically in the presumed sensitivity 
and generality of automatic vigilance. Below we evaluate whether automatic vigilance (a) is 
sensitive to degrees of negativity, and (b) generalizes across levels of arousal. First, though, 
we review the evidence of automatic vigilance more generally. 
Automatic Vigilance 
Stimuli are automatically evaluated as negative (aversive) or positive (appetitive; see 
Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Such stimulus evaluation occurs immediately (Lazarus, 
1982; Zajonc, 1980), thereby facilitating rapid avoidance and approach behaviors (Lavender 
& Hommel, 2007; Neumann, Forster, & Strack, 2003). Negative stimuli in particular are of 
paramount urgency, as the failure to avoid a negative stimulus, such as a predator, may be 
fatal. Failure to attain a positive stimulus, such as prey, is less likely to be fatal because 
additional opportunities may be forthcoming (Pratto & John, 1991). Consequently, following 
initial stimulus evaluation, attention is disengaged more slowly from negative stimuli than 
from neutral or positive stimuli (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Horstmann, 
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Scharlau, & Ansorge, 2006; McKenna & Sharma, 2004). This prolonged attentional 
monitoring of negative stimuli, termed automatic vigilance, produces slower responses to 
negative stimuli than to positive stimuli on most cognitive tasks (e.g., Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 
2004; Pratto & John, 1991; Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000).  
The Categorical Model. Failing to recognize a predator as such can be fatal. 
Discriminating the precise level of threat posed by that predator, in contrast, is less urgent. A 
categorical model of automatic vigilance therefore asserts that, in order to minimize the 
likelihood of catastrophic error, responding tends to vary more between affective categories 
than within each category (Juslin & Laukka, 2003). Essentially, all negative stimuli are 
treated as threatening, since the benefit of quickly averting an extremely dangerous stimulus 
outweighs the cost of overreacting to a mildly threatening stimulus. For instance, it is safer to 
flee unnecessarily from a hyena than to be caught deliberating whether an approaching lion is 
truly threatening. By this categorical model, slightly negative and extremely negative stimuli 
elicit equivalent levels of automatic vigilance. 
The hallmark of categorical perception is that a difference between stimuli is 
perceived to be larger if the two stimuli are from different categories than if they are from the 
same category. Emotions, whether expressed visually (e.g., Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Young, 
Rowland, Calder, & Etcoff, 1997) or vocally (Laukka, 2005), exhibit such categorical 
perception. Consider a stimulus set consisting of a sad facial expression, a happy expression, 
and several morphed expressions that vary parametrically in their degree of sadness or 
happiness. An expression that is 60% sad (and 40% happy) is judged more similar to an 
expression that is 80% sad than to one that is 40% sad (Bimler & Kirkland, 2001). Moreover, 
that 60% sad expression is also discriminated less accurately from the 80% sad expression 
than from the 40% sad expression (Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Laukka, 2005; Young et al., 1997). 
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Thus, affective differences between stimuli are attenuated within a given category and are 
accentuated between categories.  
The categorical model of automatic vigilance thus yields a clear prediction: If stimulus 
evaluation is categorical, then response times should vary between affective categories but 
should be relatively constant within each affective category. In considering the evidence of 
such a model of automatic vigilance, it may be informative to discuss more generally the 
properties of a categorical model. The primary property is a discontinuity in the response 
distribution between stimulus classes. Any process that has a categorical component must 
exhibit such discontinuity. In terms of automatic vigilance, the boundary between negative 
stimuli and positive stimuli should be sharp, indicated by a marked difference in response 
times (i.e., a steep slope) between slightly negative (e.g., “needle”) and slightly positive 
stimuli (e.g., “candy”). Discontinuity, then, corresponds to the accentuation of differences 
between categories. A secondary property of categorical models is relatively uniform 
responding within a given stimulus class (i.e., equivalence). Regarding automatic vigilance, 
extremely negative (e.g., “poison”) and slightly negative stimuli (e.g., “needle”) should elicit 
responses that are equally slow (i.e., a flat slope), and slightly positive (e.g., “candy”) and 
extremely positive stimuli (e.g., “passion”) should elicit responses that are equally fast. 
Equivalence therefore corresponds to the attenuation of differences within categories.  
The categorical model of automatic vigilance thus predicts a flat slope running from 
extremely negative to slightly negative stimuli (i.e., equivalence), followed by a steep decline 
to slightly positive stimuli (i.e., discontinuity), and finally a flat slope running from slightly 
positive to extremely positive stimuli (i.e., equivalence). Pratto and John (1991) directly 
tested this prediction. In two Stroop color naming experiments, they presented words that 
were extremely, moderately, or slightly negative or positive. Both experiments revealed an 
automatic vigilance effect that was characterized by discontinuity between categories and 
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equivalence within categories: Responses were slower to negative words than to positive 
words, but they were no slower for extremely negative words than for moderately or slightly 
negative words. Results therefore supported the categorical model. 
Estes & Adelman (this issue). Our analysis corroborated this observation of a 
categorical relation between stimulus valence and response times. With a much larger and 
better controlled stimulus set (including arousal, word length, word frequency, orthographic 
N, and contextual diversity as covariates), we found that the relation between valence and 
word recognition could be modeled as a step function. As shown in Figure 1 of Estes and 
Adelman (this issue), we observed a marked difference between negative words and positive 
words (i.e., discontinuity), but relatively little variance among negative words and among 
positive words (i.e., equivalence). Regression analyses confirmed that valence explained 
significantly more variance in both word naming and lexical decision latencies when valence 
was treated as a categorical factor (i.e., negative or positive) than when it was treated as a 
continuous factor (i.e., degrees of negativity or positivity). Thus, our analysis revealed the 
between-category discontinuity and within-category equivalence that are the signature of 
categorical processing. 
Because the primary purpose of our study was to demonstrate that valence influences 
lexical processing times, we simply covaried out all other factors known to correlate with 
lexical and affective processing. This allowed us to demonstrate that the effect of valence on 
response times was not attributable to any of those other factors. Thus, with other factors 
controlled, negative words elicit slower lexical decisions and naming than positive words. 
Moreover, this automatic vigilance does not appear sensitive to degrees of negativity; 
automatic vigilance appears to be categorical. However, this approach does not address 
whether automatic vigilance generalizes across those other factors. To do that, one must test 
whether the effect of valence on response times varies across levels of the other factor(s) of 
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interest. For instance, if valence were shown to have no effect among highly arousing words, 
this would indicate that automatic vigilance is limited to less arousing words. This is precisely 
what Larsen and colleagues claim.   
Larsen et al. (this issue). Larsen and colleagues tested whether automatic vigilance 
generalizes across levels of arousal. Using the same dataset that we had analyzed (Estes & 
Adelman, this issue), Larsen and colleagues treated valence as a continuous factor and 
included five additional nonlinear and interaction factors: (i) squared valence, (ii) cubed 
valence, (iii) arousal by linear valence interaction, (iv) arousal by squared valence interaction, 
and (v) arousal by cubed valence interaction. Although they failed to find any interaction of 
arousal and valence in word naming latencies, an interaction was observed in lexical decision 
latencies. Specifically, Larsen et al. found that among non-arousing stimuli positive words 
elicited faster lexical decisions than negative words, but among highly arousing stimuli this 
automatic vigilance effect “largely disappears” (p. ###). Despite obtaining an interaction in 
only half of their analyses, Larsen and colleagues nevertheless concluded that automatic 
vigilance does not generalize across levels of arousal. Furthermore, they also claimed that this 
interaction signaled a rejection of the categorical model, in that not all negative words elicit 
slower responding than positive words. In the following we therefore evaluate separately the 
two components of Larsen et al.’s claim that automatic vigilance is neither (i) categorical nor 
(ii) general. 
Theoretical Evaluation 
To clarify, when arousal is controlled, valence does exert a significant effect on 
response times (Estes & Adelman, this issue; Larsen et al., this issue). Larsen et al. thus do 
not reject the validity of automatic vigilance. Rather, Larsen and colleagues purport to reject 
the categorical model of automatic vigilance. Their rejection of the categorical model rests 
solely on the observation that, when treated as a linear factor, valence interacts with arousal. 
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Here we explain that Larsen and colleagues’ interaction of arousal and valence (1) is logically 
irrelevant to whether valence has a categorical effect on response times, and (2) is statistically 
consistent with the categorical model of automatic vigilance. Moreover, we also show that (3) 
automatic vigilance occurs across levels of arousal, and (4) despite having five fewer 
parameters, the categorical model predicts response times as well as Larsen et al.'s interaction 
model. Thus, as explained below, further consideration indicates that automatic vigilance is 
categorical and generalizes across levels of arousal. 
1. Larsen et al.’s purported rejection of the categorical model is logically invalid. It 
does not follow from an interaction of two factors that both factors must be graded (i.e., 
continuous). Consider for example the well documented sex difference in mental rotation of 
visual stimuli. This sex difference becomes more pronounced across the lifespan (Voyer, 
Voyer, & Bryden, 1995), thereby producing an interaction of biological sex and age. 
However, it does not follow that biological sex is graded, nor that it has a graded influence on 
mental rotation. Likewise, an interaction of arousal and valence does not in any way suggest 
that valence has a graded effect on response times. Such an interaction merely indicates that 
valence exerts a differential effect on response times at different levels of arousal; valence 
nonetheless could exert a significant categorical effect within each level of arousal. Thus, 
Larsen and colleagues have conflated sensitivity (i.e., whether automatic vigilance is 
categorical) with generality (i.e., whether automatic vigilance generalizes across levels of 
arousal). Larsen et al.’s interaction may be informative of generality, but it is logically 
irrelevant to the sensitivity of automatic vigilance. 
 2. In a regression analysis, a functional form (usually linear) is imposed on each 
predictor, and the choice of functional forms determines the underlying model being tested. A 
significant interaction indicates either that the factors are not additive, or that at least one of 
the specified functional forms is incorrect. For example, if one assumes a linear form for both 
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arousal and valence, an interaction could indicate either that the two factors are nonadditive or 
that at least one of the factors is nonlinear. In their analyses Larsen et al. assumed linear forms 
for both arousal and valence, and from the interaction they concluded that arousal and valence 
are nonadditive. However, the interaction could simply indicate that arousal and/or valence is 
nonlinear. Indeed, the interaction between linear arousal and linear valence is perfectly 
consistent with our prior demonstration that valence has a nonlinear (categorical) effect on 
response times (Estes & Adelman, this issue). 
 3. To clearly demonstrate that arousal and valence are nonadditive, the interaction of 
arousal and valence must be shown within the best model (i.e., with the best-fitting functional 
form). Given our prior demonstration that a categorical valence model significantly 
outperforms a linear valence model (Estes & Adelman, this issue), an interaction of arousal 
and valence would only be theoretically informative if it occurred within a categorical valence 
model. We therefore examined whether arousal interacts with categorical valence in 
predicting lexical decision times. Valence and arousal ratings were again taken from the 
ANEW dataset (Bradley & Lang, 1999a) and mean lexical decision times were again taken 
from the ELP dataset (Balota et al., 2002). Additional predictors were length in letters, length 
in syllables, word frequency log-transformed (from HAL; Burgess, 1998), word frequency 
log-transformed and squared (see Balota, Cortese, Sergent-Marshall, Spieler, & Yap, 2004), 
and orthographic N (from ELP). We first conducted a regression with a categorical (binary) 
form for valence and a simple linear form for arousal. In replication of our previous result 
(Estes & Adelman, this issue), categorical valence exerted a significant effect on response 
times [t(1012) = 5.20, p < .0001], thus confirming the observation of automatic vigilance. 
Critically, however, categorical valence did not interact with arousal [t(1012) = 1.64, p > .10].  
 To be conservative, we also ran several additional regressions with valence treated as 
a categorical factor and with arousal treated as a quadratic or cubic factor, and as a categorical 
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factor with two, three, four, five or six levels. In each of the analyses categorical valence 
exerted a significant effect on lexical decision times (all p < .05), and in none of these 
analyses did arousal interact significantly with categorical valence (all p > .05). Thus, 
automatic vigilance generalized across levels of arousal. For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 
presents the data from one of these regressions. In this particular analysis we created high, 
mid, and low arousal groups by splitting the words from ANEW into upper, middle, and 
lower thirds of arousal ratings. Within each arousal level, negative and positive valence 
groups were created by treating valence ratings as categorically negative or positive. Figure 1 
plots the mean lexical decision latencies for those words, adjusted for the aforementioned 
control factors of length, frequency, and orthographic N. The figure yields three important 
observations. 
3A. First, the magnitude of the automatic vigilance effect remained constant across 
levels of arousal, varying only from 16.1 ms to 17.5 ms. This automatic vigilance effect is 
evident in Figure 1 as the vertical distance (i.e., along the Y-axis) between the negative mean 
and the positive mean within each level of arousal. Treating valence as a categorical factor 
thus reveals that valence produced a constant effect of approximately 17 ms on lexical 
decision times. That is, the high arousal words exhibited the same automatic vigilance effect 
as the low arousal words. These data therefore contradict Larsen et al’s claim that highly 
arousing stimuli do not exhibit an automatic vigilance effect. 
3B. Second, arousal and valence are non-independent (Bradley & Lang, 1999b; Larsen 
et al., this issue). Highly arousing stimuli tend to be extremely negative or extremely positive, 
whereas low arousal stimuli tend to be of moderate valence. The non-independence of arousal 
and valence is evident here in Figure 1 as the horizontal distance (i.e., along the X-axis) 
between the negative mean and the positive mean within each level of arousal: The high 
arousal words exhibit the largest distance (i.e., are most extreme) and the low arousal words 
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exhibit the smallest distance (i.e., are least extreme). As explained below, this relationship 
between arousal and valence has statistical implications. 
3C. Third, the slope of the automatic vigilance effect varied systematically across 
levels of arousal. Namely, the slope becomes increasingly steeper from high arousal (-3.56) to 
mid arousal (-4.74) and to low arousal (-7.41). This difference in slope emerges from the non-
independence of arousal and valence, coupled with the constant magnitude of the automatic 
vigilance effect. That is, because the effect size (i.e., the vertical distance) remained constant 
while the range (i.e., the horizontal distance) decreased across levels of arousal, the slope 
consequently increased across levels of arousal. This observation may explain why Larsen 
and colleagues obtained an interaction: When valence is treated as a continuous factor, these 
differences in slope produce an interaction of arousal and valence. But the present analyses 
indicate that when treated properly as a categorical factor, valence does not interact with 
arousal.  
4. Above we have shown that the presumed interaction between arousal and valence is 
logically irrelevant to and statistically consistent with the claim that automatic vigilance is 
categorical. From a theoretical perspective, then, Larsen et al.’s analyses do not challenge the 
categorical model of automatic vigilance. From a practical perspective, though, Larsen et al.’s 
interaction model could nonetheless be preferable if it were shown to predict word 
recognition latencies better than the categorical model. Thus, to statistically compare the 
models, we conducted regression analyses with word length (number of letters), word 
frequency log-transformed (from HAL; Burgess, 1998), word frequency log-transformed and 
squared (from HAL; Balota et al., 2004), orthographic N (from ELP; Balota et al., 2002), 
arousal (linear, from ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999a), and valence (from ANEW) as 
predictors of z-transformed lexical decision and word naming latencies (from ELP; cf. Larsen 
et al., this issue). The categorical model, which treated valence as binary, yielded adjusted R2 
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of 60.28% for lexical decision and 41.69% for naming. The interaction model treated valence 
as a linear factor, and also included the five additional nonlinear and interaction factors used 
by Larsen et al. (i.e., squared valence, cubed valence, arousal by linear valence interaction, 
arousal by squared valence interaction, and arousal by cubed valence interaction). This model 
yielded adjusted R2 of 60.46% for lexical decision and 41.49% for naming. Thus, despite 
having five additional parameters, the interaction model failed to explain any additional 
variance in word recognition times. Or stated conversely, despite its simplicity the categorical 
model explained as much variance as the interaction model. Parsimony therefore favors the 
categorical model. 
Conclusions 
Below we summarize the evidence pertaining to the sensitivity and generality of 
automatic vigilance. 
Is automatic vigilance sensitive to degrees of negativity? Pratto and John (1991) first 
showed that slightly negative and extremely negative words elicit equally slow responding, 
and that slightly positive and extremely positive words elicit equally fast responding. This 
discontinuity between valence categories and equivalence within categories indicates that 
automatic vigilance is categorical. That is, automatic vigilance is not sensitive to degrees of 
negativity (or positivity). Our regression analyses (Estes & Adelman, this issue), which 
included a much larger and better controlled stimulus set, demonstrated unequivocally that a 
categorical model of valence significantly outperformed a linear model. Larsen et al. (this 
issue) did not dispute this. Instead, they claimed that an interaction of linear arousal and linear 
valence—which was observed in lexical decision times but not in word naming—signals a 
rejection of the categorical model. We have shown that (1) this interaction is logically 
irrelevant to the categorical model, (2) the linear interaction is statistically consistent with the 
categorical model, (3) the interaction is not observed within the categorical model, and (4) the 
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interaction model fails to outperform the simpler categorical model. Thus, Larsen and 
colleagues’ analyses do not in any way challenge the categorical model of automatic 
vigilance. So in summary, although only two studies (i.e., Estes & Adelman, this issue; Pratto 
& John, 1991) have directly addressed this question, results from both studies suggest that 
automatic vigilance is insensitive to degrees of negativity. 
Does automatic vigilance generalize across levels of arousal? Although our original 
analysis demonstrated an effect of valence on word recognition times when arousal was 
statistically controlled, it did not test whether this automatic vigilance effect generalizes 
across levels of arousal. Larsen and colleagues therefore proposed and tested an interaction 
model of automatic vigilance. From the significant interaction of linear arousal and linear 
valence they concluded that automatic vigilance does not generalize across levels of arousal. 
Specifically, they claimed that automatic vigilance occurs among non-arousing words but not 
among highly arousing words. Here we have shown that the interaction does not occur when 
the correct functional form is tested, that automatic vigilance was observed among highly 
arousing words, and that the magnitude of the automatic vigilance effect was constant across 
levels of arousal (see points 3 and 3A above). Although the non-independence of arousal and 
valence poses a methodological obstacle (see points 3B and 3C), the present evidence 
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Figure 1. Mean adjusted lexical decision times as a function of arousal (high, mid, low) and 
valence (negative, positive). Different slopes are observed across levels of arousal, thereby 
producing the arousal × valence interaction reported by Larsen et al. (this issue). Critically, 
however, the magnitude of the valence effect (16-18 ms) remains constant across levels of 
arousal.  
 
 
 
